The Fifth Amendment Due Process Rights of Interdicted Haitian Refugees by Jones, Geoffrey
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 21
Number 4 Summer 1994 Article 7
1-1-1994
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Rights of
Interdicted Haitian Refugees
Geoffrey Jones
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Geoffrey Jones, The Fifth Amendment Due Process Rights of Interdicted Haitian Refugees, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1071 (1994).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol21/iss4/7
NOTE
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Rights
of Interdicted Haitian Refugees
By GEOFFREY JONES*




I. An Overview of Haitian History ........................ 1073
A. A History of Political Oppression ................... 1073
B. Haitian Migration to the United States: 1972-1994.. 1081
C. Prior Litigation on Behalf of Interdicted Haitian
Refugees ............................................ 1082
II. The Due Process Right to a Meaningful Asylum
H earing ................................................. 1083
A. American Refugee and Asylum Law ............... 1084
B. Procedural Due Process ............................ 1086
III. The Procedural Due Process Rights of Interdicted
Haitian Refugees ....................................... 1091
A. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees and Section 243(h)(1) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act ................................. 1097
B. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith .................... 1098
C. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council ..................... 1100
D. Other Property Interests: Agency Regulations and
Custom s ............................................ 1103
E. New Liberty Interests and Procedural Due
Process ............................................. 1106
* J.D. 1994, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Law Clerk to
Judge Byron J. Johnson, Idaho Supreme Court.
1. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
[10711
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:1071
IV. Substantive Due Process Rights of Interdicted Haitian
Refugees ................................................ 1110
A . Introduction ........................................ 1110




On September 30, 1991, Haiti's democratically elected govern-
ment, headed by President Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown
by a violent military coup.2 The new government and its supporters
took immediate retribution upon Aristide's many supporters. Human
rights abuses skyrocketed and an exodus from Haiti began.
On May 23, 1992, ostensibly because the Guantanamo Bay deten-
tion center had become overcrowded, George Bush issued the "Ken-
nebunkport Order."' 4 This executive order altered United States'
policy by providing for the interdiction and forced repatriation of Hai-
tian refugees without making any effort to determine whether they
were fleeing political persecution.' Thus, Haitian refugees were inter-
dicted by the boat load and returned against their will to a country
with an infamous history of human rights abuses,6 and which was ex-
periencing arguably its worst period of political strife and violence.7
Haitian refugees interdicted at sea have Fifth Amendment rights
to political asylum hearings, rights which the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service has conspicuously violated since May of 1992. The
new administration has not yet alleviated the Haitian refugees' situa-
tion; President Clinton has continued the Bush Administration's pol-
icy despite campaign promises to the contrary.' Only recently,
Clinton vowed to end this policy and to give asylum hearings to inter-
2. Haitians Delivered to Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1992, at A18.
3. Elizabeth Kurylo, Haitians In Atlanta Look Back On A Nightmare, ATLANTA
CONST., Dec. 15, 1992, at Al.
4. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133, 23,133-34 (1992); see Haitian Centers
Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1352 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom., Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
5. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1352-53; see Haitians Delivered to Danger, supra note 1, at
A18.
6. See infra notes 50-102 and accompanying text.
7. See Howard W. French, Political Terror Stalks Haiti-Worst Since the Army Coup,
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 2, 1994, at Al.
8. Linda Greenhouse, Court is Asked to Back Haitians' Return, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1993, at A6.
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dicted Haitian refugees.9 It remains to be seen how this policy change
will be implemented and whether meaningful hearings will be given.10
There is widespread concern that the policy change will be a facade
like the asylum screening procedures the Bush Administration em-
ployed prior to the Kennebunkport Order," under which a very small
proportion of refugees were found eligible for political asylum,
although a large proportion are fleeing political persecution. The
Clinton Administration has not placated this concern by asserting that
it expects not more than five percent of the refugees interviewed to be
eligible for political asylum.'" The rest will be returned to Haiti.
13
Until the Clinton Administration gives meaningful hearings to in-
terdicted Haitian refugees before they are repatriated, it is violating
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The applicability of
due process protection to Haitian refugees cannot be fully under-
stood, however, without reference to Haiti's chaotic political history.
I. An Overview of Haitian History
Haiti has a long and unfortunate history of violent political op-
pression which has caused episodes of widespread emigration. Hai-
tian immigration to the United States has occurred at significant levels
for more than twenty years. As a result, the previous two decades
have seen much litigation on behalf of Haitian refugees.
A. A History of Political Oppression
Haiti occupies the western third of Hispaniola, 4 sharing the is-
land with the Dominican Republic.' 5 Haiti is a predominantly agra-
rian society with a population of less than 7 million. 6 It is the poorest
9. Haiti: Policy Shift Is Only A Partial Measure, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 10,
1994, at 12A.
10. See Diego Ribadeneira, Living On The Run In Military's Haiti, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 15, 1994, at 1.
11. Pamela Constable, U.S. Urged To Alter Refugee Screening Process, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 14, 1994, at 6.
12. Marcus Stem, Haiti's Boat Builders Get Busier; New U.S. Policy On Immigration
Sparks Demand, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 13, 1994, at Al.
13. See Haiti" Policy Shift Is Only A Partial Measure, supra note 8, at 12A.
14. FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, HAM: A COUNTRY STUDY 1
(1985).
15. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, DOMINICAN RE-
PUBLIC AND HAm: COUNTRY STUDIES 196 (1991).
16. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
429 (1991).
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nation in the western hemisphere, with an average income of less than
$425 U.S. per year.'
7
Spain colonized Haiti in 1492 when Columbus landed on the
northwestern tip of Hispaniola. 18 In the first fifty years of their rule,
the Spanish exterminated the indigenous Taino Arawak people, 9 kill-
ing half a million by forcing them to work in Spanish gold mines.20
The Spanish then replaced them with African slaves.2' The western
portion of Hispaniola, which is now Haiti, was settled by French immi-
grants after the gold mines were depleted and the Spanish lost interest
in the region.22 The French settlers established permanent settlements
and named the area Saint Domingue.23 French control of Saint Dom-
ingue was formalized in 1697 when Spain ceded it to France. 4 The
French controlled Saint Domingue for a century, importing their lan-
guage and culture, which still remain strong influences in Haiti.25 The
French also imported many African slaves.26
The slaves revolted against the French in 1791, and after a strug-
gle of thirteen years, in 1804, they defeated the troops of Napoleon
Bonaparte and won their freedom.2 7 Haiti thus became the second
independent state in the Western Hemisphere and the first free black
republic in the world.28 Haiti's experiment with democracy, however,
achieved chaotic results over the next century and ended when the
United States invaded and occupied Haiti in 1915 to stabilize the is-
land and protect American interests.2 9 The occupation lasted for 19
years, until 1934.30 During this period, Haiti retained only a facade of
autonomous self-government as the United States controlled Haitian
customs houses and administrative institutions and held veto power
17. Id. at 290.
18. JAMES FERGUSON, PAPA Doc, BABY Doc: HAITI AND THE DUVALIERS 1 (1987).
19. Norman Lockman, Haiti-No Respite From a Turbulent History, GANNEr NEWS
SERV., Oct. 28, 1993.
20. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 1-2.
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at
206.
25. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 2-3.
26. Id. at 3
27. Id. at 6-7.
28. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at
213.
29. Id. at 223.
30. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 37.
Summer 19941 HAITIAN REFUGEES' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
over the few decisions Haitians still made."' Only small-scale local
government institutions remained entirely in Haitian hands.3 2 In or-
der to help the Marines police the country, the American advisors cre-
ated the Garde d'Haiti,a3 the nation's first national army, which would
later play a dominant role in the nation's politics.34 Aside from train-
ing and equipping the Garde, however, the United States did little to
prepare the Haitians to govern themselves when the time came for
independence.35 Thus, when the American occupation forces with-
drew in 1934, the only cohesive institution left in their wake was the
Haitian military. 6
Haiti held democratic elections in 1934, but in 1937 the military
seized control of the country.37 In 1946, the military acquiesced to
public clamor for democratic elections and an aggressive anti-elite
named Dumarsais Estime won the presidency through the support of
the peasantry and urban working class.38 As Aristide would fifty
years later, Estime thoroughly alienated the elites and military and,
like Aristide's, his tenure was short.39 The military deposed him after
less than four years,4° and held a new election in which a member of
the military-elite, Paul Magloire, was elected president amid allega-
tions of election fraud.4 When his four year term ended, Magloire
refused to allow constitutionally mandated elections, declaring himself
"President for Life."'42 The populace promptly revolted and Magloire
fled the country.43 Once again, the military seized control of the tiny
nation.44 The next elections took place in 1957 and appeared to be
fair,4 5 despite a heavy military presence at the polling places. These
31. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at
224.
32. Id
33. Id. at 353-55.
34. See id. at 227-29, 353-54.
35. Id. at 335; see generally id. at 353-364.
36. Id. at 226-27.
37. Id. at 228-29.
38. Id. at 230.
39. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 34-35.
40. FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, supra note 14, at 37.
41. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at
231.
42. FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, supra note 14, at 38; FEDERAL
RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at 231.
43. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 36.
44. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at
231.
45. IaM
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elections were also Haiti's first exercise in universal suffrage.46 Un-
happily, however, a taciturn country doctor named Francois Duvalier
won the election.4 7 Duvalier prevailed through a mixture of patriot-
ism, racism, and mysticism. 48 He also enjoyed the support of the mili-
tary, in addition to maintaining the loyalty of the masses of
impoverished Haitians.49 Soon after his election, he consolidated his
power through ruthless purges of his political opponents, suspected
and real." Although Duvalier's first election was a fair one, four
years later he was reelected by the suspicious margin of 1,320,748
votes to zero.5 ' He then declared himself "President for Life," as his
last seven predecessors had done.52 Unlike Haitian leaders before
him, however, Duvalier had successfully destroyed all organized op-
position in his first term, and his claim to a permanent presidency
went largely unopposed. 3
A key factor in the Duvalier autocracy was his creation of a local
militia, the Tontons Macoutes.54 The Tontons Macoutes were not
under the auspices of the military; they answered only to Duvalier and
achieved his twin goals of offsetting the political power of the mi'litary
and consolidating his control of the populace, especially in rural ar-
46. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 36-37.
47. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at
231. Francios Duvalier came to be popularly known as "Papa Doc." See id at 234.
48. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 37.
49. Id. at 37.
50. Id. at 38-39. It is estimated that during Francois Duvalier's reign the Tontons
Macoutes killed more than 30,000 suspected political opponents. FEDERAL RESEARCH Di-
VISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at 326.




54. In Haiti's national language, Creole, Tonton Macoute is literally translated as "Un-
cle Knapsack." Uncle Knapsack is a dark figure of Haitian folklore who swept up errant
children, tossing them in a sack carried on his back. He is the Haitian version of the
Boogieman. See The Bogieman's Back, Striking Fear Into Haitians, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1994, at A4; FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 40. In an interview with a New York Tunes
reporter, a former Tonton Macoute who is now a neo-Duvalierist thug and member of
FRAPH elaborated on his career as a Macoute and the origin of that group's name. "[Un-
cle Knapsack] doesn't begin to express what I was," he said laughing, "I didn't bother with
children. I carried a big enough sack to sweep up anyone who got in my way." The
Bogieman's Back, Striking Fear Into Haitians, supra, at A4. The acronym FRAPH stands
for the French translation of Haitian Front for Advancement and Progress. It is a recently-
formed, reactionary political group that has engaged in extensive violent repression of
Aristide's supporters and other reformists. FRAPH consists largely of former Tontons
Macoutes. See Haiti Gang Warning of More Raids, Name of Slum Becomes Issue, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 3, 1994, at 4.
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eas.55 In time, the Tontons Macoutes evolved to assume the function
of a draconian secret police as well.56
When Francois Duvalier died in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude, suc-
ceeded him, as the elder Duvalier had mandated.57 Jean-Claude
Duvalier,5 8 like his father, controlled a parasitic "kleptocracy" which
siphoned off international aide and exploited the population, keeping
the citizenry in a state of endemic poverty. 9 The United States was
the primary source of financial aid to both Duvalier regimes,6" and
supplied a majority of weapons used by the national army and the
Tontons Macoutes.6 1 The United States supported the Duvalier re-
gimes, despite extensive human rights abuses and flagrant misappro-
priation of aid, because of Haiti's strategic location near Soviet-bloc
Cuba.62 Jean-Claude Duvalier was less politically adept than his fa-
ther and more avaricious.63 His mismanagement of the government,
along with the greed of the ruling class, caused the already abysmal
quality of life in Haiti to fall sharply during his reign.64 The increasing
poverty and economic chaos of the country,65 as well as epidemics in
55. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 40-41.
56. Id. at 41; see FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra
note 15, at 233. The Tontons Macoutes were formed during Duvalier's first term by a loyal
lieutenant, Clement Barbot. In order to neutralize the power of the Haitian national mili-
tary, Barbot created the Tontons Macoutes to be loyal only to Duvalier. In addition to
using Tonton Macoutes as a local militia to offset the power of the Army, they were used as
a secret police force. In this function they gathered information, detected subversion, and
ruthlessly spread terror among all non-Duvalierist segments of Haitian society. Their
targets were anyone disloyal to Duvalier, and included the Boy Scouts, the Catholic
Church, and trade unions. By 1963, Duvalier had used the Tontons Macoutes to silence all
detractors: the army was impotent, and all opposition leaders, perceived or real, were in
exile or dead. See FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 40-44.
57. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at
326.
58. Jean-Claude Duvalier became popularly known as "Baby Doc." See id.
59. Id. at 235-36.
60. Id. at 234-37.
61. Id. at 390.
62. Id. at 235. The Duvaliers consistently spent foreign aid money earmarked for Ha-
iti's poor on their secret police force, the military, the elites, and their own excessive life-
styles. Id. at 233-34.
63. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 69-70.
64. Id. at 235.
65. UNrrED NATIONS, supra note 16, at 432-33. The growth of Haiti's gross national
product lagged significantly behind population growth in the 1980s. Id. As a result, per
capita income fell steadily during the 1980s, with Haiti already being the poorest nation in
the Americas. Id. at 433; see FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, supra note 15, at 281. Furthermore, inflation during the 1980s caused instability and
contributed to the overall bleak picture. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 16, at 429, 432.
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rural areas,66 led to Jean-Claude's forced abdication in February of
1986.67 The popular revolt that ousted Jean-Claude Duvalier sought
to destroy the very foundations of Duvalierism, but supporters of
"Baby Doc" have nonetheless remained a powerful force in Haitian
politics. 68 The junior Duvalier's departure left the country economi-
cally ravaged, devoid of democratic political institutions, and without
any tradition of peaceful self-rule. 69 The only stable institution re-
maining was the Haitian military, and the Tontons Macoutes were
hunted and killed in large numbers by angry mobs.7° On February 10,
1986, the Tontons Macoutes were formally disbanded, but the groups
members were protected by the military.
71
After Duvalier's fall in 1986, a series of short-lived governments
ruled the country.72 Eventually, amid violent election tampering, Les-
lie Manigat was elected President in 1988.73 The military promptly
deposed him, however, for trying to enforce Haiti's constitutional lim-
its on the army's power and not serving as a mere figurehead.74 The
military faction that deposed Manigat took control of the government,
with general Henri Naphy at its head, and rescinded the 1987 Consti-
tution in July of 1988.75 Human rights abuses escalated as Duvalierist
factions took revenge upon their rivals with tolerance from the new
government. 76 Namphy himself was ousted in a coup by the elite pres-
idential guard on September of 1988. 7 The orchestrator of the coup,
66. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at
235.
67. Id. at 328; 237-38.
68. Id. at 328-29.
69. Id. at 238.
70. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 122-23.
71. Id. at 123.
72. The period from February, 1986 to September, 1988 witnessed five successive gov-
ernments, the election of a constituent assembly, the popular ratification of a new constitu-
tion and the repeated massacre of citizens by military factions, including the Tontons
Macoutes, for exercising political rights such as voting in free elections. FEDERAL RE-
SEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at 325.
73. Id. at 329.
74. Id.
75. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at
329.
76. Id. In a notable incident, a group of Tontons Macoutes entered a church in Port-
au-Prince where there was a well-known anti-Duvalierist minister, murdered a number of
worshipers and set fire to the church. Id.
77. AMY WILENTZ, THE RAINY SEASON: HAITI SINCE DUVALIER 359-60 (1989).
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Lieutenant General Prosper Avril, succeeded Namphy as President
and purged the Haitian officer corps to solidify his position.78
Popular unrest broke out and escalated through the early months
of 1989.7 9 Avril's government became increasingly unstable,8" and fi-
nally acquiesced to the public's demand for popular elections. On De-
cember 16, 1990, the long-awaited elections took place, and a Catholic
priest"' named Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected president.82 Father
Aristide enjoyed widespread popularity among the poor Haitian
masses, but lacked the support of the elites and the military.83 He had
barely begun his promised program of progressive reforms when a
bloody coup by the military forced him from office and into exile on
September 30, 1991.84 General Raoul Cedras, once Aristide's most
trusted advisor and ally in the military, engineered the coup.85 Cedras
became the de facto leader of Haiti,86 setting up a series of puppet
civil governments that ostensibly ruled the country.87 A violent back-
lash against Aristide's supporters followed.8  Human rights abuses es-
calated 89 as the military and Duvalierist factions such as FRAPH,90
78. FEDERAL RESEARCH DrIvisION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 15, at
359-61.
79. Id at 360.
80. WILENTz, supra note 77, at 372.
81. Ben Barber, Schism Over Aristide Pits Haiti's Catholics In War Of Ideology; Poor
Fear Violence; Rich Fear Marxism, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1993, at Al.
82. J. Taylor Wentges, A Grisly Walk Through Haiti's Killing Fields; A Few Military
Police Maintain a Reign of Terror With Routine, Relentless Murders, TORONTO STAR, Dec.
18, 1993, at C5; see Haitians Delivered to Danger, supra note 2, at A18. Aristide won the
election with 67 percent of the popular vote. Id.
83. See Barber, supra note 81; Steven A. Holmes, Aristide Seeks The Removal Of
Army And Police Chiefs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1993, at A3; see also Lockman, supra note
19.
84. Kathie Klarreich, Haiti-The Pressure Mounts; Unchecked Violence Haunts Port-au-
Prince Streets, HOUSTON CHRON., May 7, 1994, at A22. The coup took place at night and
the Army immediately shot anyone who came outside to protest. Nonetheless, many still
attempted to protest the ouster of Aristide. Dump trucks were used to remove their bod-
ies, and fire hoses to wash away their blood. Ben Barber, Sanctions Force Little Progress in
Haiti, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at A12.
85. Isabel Hilton, Aristide's Dream of Haiti, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 30, 1993, at 28.
86. Simon Tisdall, Horror's Homeland, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 30, 1993, at 4.
87. Howard W. French, In Haiti's Army, Business Is the Order of the Day, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 1993, at A21.
88. Howard W. French, Haitian Police Chief Emerges From the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 1993, at A5; Wentges, supra note 82, at C5.
89. Linda Diebel, Waiting for Aristide, MONTREAL GAZErrE, Sept. 18, 1993, at B3.
90. See supra note 54.
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took revenge? 1 An exodus from Haiti began as Aristide's supporters
took to the sea in any thing that would float.92
Since the September 1991 coup, General Cedras has ruled the
country, and human rights abuses have occurred at levels comparable
to the worst years of the Duvaliers. 93 The military, Tontons Macoutes,
FRAPH, and other supporters of Cedras' government have engaged
in a campaign of terrorism and persecution based on their victims'
political opinion,94 religion,95 social group,96 and sex.97
Recently, politically motivated violence against Aristide's sup-
porters has escalated dramatically,98 with FRAPH blamed for at least
75 political murders during February and March of 1994 alone.99 In
addition to becoming more widespread, politically motivated violence
in recent months has become more vicious, with the rise of apparently
unprecedented practices such as political rapes,1°° burning of entire
neighborhoods,' and "facial scalping," where the victims face is re-
moved with a machete.'0
91. See Wentges, supra note 82, at CS.
92. See Haitians Delivered to Danger, supra note 2, at A18.
93. Since the coup it is estimated that over 4000 Haitians have been killed in politically
motivated violence. Marcus Stem, Haiti Cops Intensify Political Brutality; Repression
Targets Pro-Aristide Slums, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 14, 1994, at Al.
94. Any intimation that Aristide is the legitimate ruler of Haiti is a basis for severe
persecution. Diebel, supra note 89, at B3; see, e.g., Howard W. French, For Haitians The
Carnival Must Go On, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 13, 1994, at A4 (documenting one such instance of
persecution). For instance, it is illegal to put up a poster of Aristide, or to pass out flyers
with Aristide's name or picture on them. This infraction of Haiti's criminal code has been
punished by death. Deibel, supra note 89, at B3.
95. Barber, supra note 81, at Al.
96. One such social group is the poor. Wentges, supra note 82, at CS. Another is
those living in areas perceived as reformist strongholds by Duvalierists and other reaction-
aries. Haiti Gang Warning of More Raids, Name of Slum Becomes Issue, supra note 54, at
4. More generally, those living in rural areas have been persecuted because they are per-
ceived as political enemies of the current regime. Howard W. French, Fearful Rural Hai-
tians Yearn for Aristide's Return, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1993, at A3. Other identifiable
social groups that have experienced persecution are students, trade unionists, peasant lead-
ers, and journalists. Deibel, supra note 89, at B3.
97. Deibel, supra note 89, at B3.
98. See Haitian Military Takes Fiery Revenge on Mountain Town, S.F. CHRON., May 3,
1994, at A12.
99. Russel Watson, We're Trapped on Haiti, NEWSWEEK, April 4, 1994, at 40.
100. Id.
101. French, supra note 7, at Al.
102. Watson, supra note 99, at 40.
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B. Haitian Migration to the United States: 1972-1994
Haitians first left their homeland by sea for the United States in
significant numbers in 1972.103 In response to escalating migration
throughout the 1970s, the Reagan Administration entered into an
agreement with the Duvalier government in 1981 under which the
United States would interdict Haitian vessels, suspected of carrying
refugees to the United States.1°  American vessels interdicted Hai-
tians and gave them informal hearings in which immigration agents
evaluated their claims of persecution.10 5 Claimants who passed were
"screened in" to the United States, where they then went through a
formal application process.0 6 Those identified as economic rather
than political refugees were repatriated to Haiti. 10 7 This policy contin-
ued until May 23, 1992 when George Bush issued the Kennebunkport
Order, providing for the interdiction and repatriation of Haitian refu-
gees without a hearing to determine whether they have legitimate
claims to refugee status.'0 8 The initial justification for the Ken-
nebunkport Order was that the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay
had become overcrowded, but as the crowding eased, and even after
the detention facility was emptied, the policy remained in effect. 10 9
Subsequently, the Bush Administration attempted to justify the forci-
ble repatriation policy as a necessary measure to protect Haitian refu-
gees by discouraging them from setting sail in unseaworthy vessels." 0
Despite campaign promises made during his 1992 presidential
campaign, President Bill Clinton retained for over a year what he had
called during the campaign the "cruel" policy of returning Haitian ref-
ugees without an asylum hearing."' Recently, on May 8, 1994, Clin-
ton promised to end the policy of repatriating Haitians without an
asylum hearing." 2 It remains to be seen whether meaningful hearings
103. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 979-80 (S.D. Fla. 1982); see also Jeffrey C.
Gilbert & Steven Kaso, Note, Jean v. Nelson: A Stark Pattern of Discrimination,
36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1005, 1005 (1982).
104. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1500-01 (11th Cir. 1992).
105. Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 978-981.
106. Id.
107. Michael D. Patrick, The Supreme Court's Haitian Interdiction Decision, N.Y. L.J.,
July 30, 1993, at 3.
108. Robert Pear, U.N. Drafts Asylum Plan For Boat People From Haiti, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1992, at Al.
109. Greg McDonald, Bush Slams Door Shut On Haitians, HOUSTON CHRON., May 25,
1992, at A22.
110. Haitians Delivered to Danger, supra note 2, at A18.
111. Greenhouse, supra note 8, at A6.
112. U.S. Seeking Shelter For Haitians, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1994, at C27.
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will be afforded to interdicted refugees, 13 but for the time being it
appears unlikely that the interdiction policy will undergo anything but
the most superficial alteration.
1 4
C. Prior Litigation on Behalf of Interdicted Haitian Refugees
Litigation on the behalf of Haitian refugees began in the 1970s
when they first immigrated to the United States in significant num-
bers." -5 When the United States hardened its attitude toward Haitian
immigration in 1981 under the Reagan Administration, civil rights ad-
vocates increased their efforts challenging the executive's policies to-
ward Haitian refugees." 6 Until recently, however, few cases have
challenged the Immigration and Naturalization Service policy of in-
terdicting Haitian refugees, which began in 1981.17 One case that did
so was Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker,"8 which challenged the in-
terdiction policy that existed prior to Bush's Kennebunkport Order,
whereby interdicted Haitian refugees received asylum screenings at
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. The primary constitutional
claim asserted in Baker was the First Amendment right of attorneys
seeking to provide pro bono representation to interdicted Haitian asy-
lum applicants at Guantanamo." 9 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
policy barring attorneys' access to the refugees did not violate the law-
yers' First Amendment rights because the prospective clients had no
underlying substantive right under the laws or Constitution of the
United States. 2 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on February
113. Carl T. Rowan, Convincing Voice On U.S. Role In Haiti, HOUSTON CHRON., May
12, 1994, at B18.
114. See id.; Barbara Kessler, Haitians In Dallas Back Policy; Immigrants Fear Political
Refugees Top Clinton's Limit, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 13, 1994, at 34A.
115. See supra text accompanying note 103.
116. Examples of such litigation include Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1990)
(challenging Haitians' detention in Florida); Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32 (2nd Cir. 1984)
(challenging INS translation services policy in asylum procedures); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F.
Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (challenging INS detention policies in Southern Florida's Krome
Detention Center) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, 727
F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), remand affd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Haitian Refugee Center v.
Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.C. 1985) (challenging interdiction of Haitian refugees), affd,
809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.
1992) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
117. See generally, Abigail D. King, Note, Interdiction: The United States' Continuing
Violation Of International Law, 68 B.U. L. REv. 773, 775-784 (1988).
118. 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
119. Id. at 1503.
120. Id. at 1511-15. The decisions in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), recognized a First Amendment right of expression and associ-
ation in an attorney's solicitation of prospective litigants. Button, 371 U.S. at 428-29;
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24, 1992, only twenty days after the Eleventh Circuit decision, with
Justice Blackmun dissenting.
121
The only Supreme Court case addressing the interdiction policy
implemented by Bush's Kennebunkport Order is Sale v. Haitian Cen-
ters Council.22 The Second Circuit had ruled that the executive
branch violated section 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act' 23 by repatriating Haitian refugees without giving them a mean-
ingful opportunity to apply for political asylum. 2 4 The Supreme
Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that executive's interdic-
tion policy was not contrary to the Act. 25
Regardless of the legality of the INS' actions under the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, the denial of a meaningful opportunity to
apply for political asylum is a violation of the due process rights of
interdicted Haitian refugees.
H. The Due Process Right to a Meaningful Asylum Hearing
The high levels of political violence in Haiti insures that a large
portion of the refugees fleeing that island meet the criteria for refugee
status and political asylum under the United States' immigration laws.
The executive's refusal to apply the immigration laws in an unbiased
manner to interdicted Haitian refugees violates the procedural and
substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Federal court pre-
cedent applying these doctrines requires that interdicted refugees be
given a fair hearing to determine if they are fleeing political persecu-
tion before they are repatriated.
Primus, 436 U.S. at 439. The Baker court reasoned that Button and Primus should be
distinguished because "[i]n the present case, the interdicted Haitians have no recognized
substantive rights under the laws or Constitution of the United States. Thus, it would be
nonsensical to find that HRC possesses a right of access to the interdicted Haitians for the
purpose of advising them of their legal rights." Baker, 953 F.2d at 1513.
121. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992). Justice Blackmun stated that "whether the Haitians
may challenge the adequacy of procedures employed by the United States Government to
identify those facing political persecution is difficult and susceptible to competing interpre-
tations. A quick glance at this Court's docket reveals not only that we have room to con-
sider these issues, but that they are at least as significant as any we have chosen to review
today. If indeed the Haitians are to be returned to an uncertain future in their strife-torn
homeland, that ruling should come from this Court, after full and careful consideration of
the merits of their claims." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. 113 S. Ct 2549 (1993), rev'g McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d
Cir. 1992). Chris Sale was the acting commissioner of the INS when the Supreme Court
heard the case, having replaced Gene McNary in that office with the change in
administrations.
123. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
124. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1361.
125. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2562.
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A. American Refugee and Asylum Law
Asylum is theoretically available to any person who flees his or
her homeland because of persecution based on race, political opinion,
religion, social group, or national origin. 126 The Immigration and Na-
tionality Act provides two avenues through which foreigners who
would face persecution if forced to return to their homeland may be
given sanctuary in the United States. First, section 243(h)(1) of the
Act prohibits the Attorney General from returning "any alien.., to a
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."' 27 To receive the protection of this statute, the foreigner
must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he or she would
be subject to persecution upon return.
28
Second, in contrast to section 243(h)(1)'s mandatory proscription
of the return of any qualifying foreigner, section 208(a) of the Act
allows the Attorney General, in her discretion, to grant asylum to a
foreigner who meets the criteria for a "refugee" under section
101(a)(42). 29 That section defines a refugee as "any person who is
outside any country of such person's nationality.., and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."' 30 The discretionary relief of section
208(a) is available to a broader class of foreigners than the mandatory
relief of section 243(h)(1). The "well-founded fear" language of the
section 101(a)(42) requires a significantly lower level of proof than
section 243(h)(1) requires. 31 Thus, Congress has provided for an ab-
solute right to sanctuary in the United States for foreigners who can
demonstrate a probability of persecution if returned to their home-
land and discretionary relief to a broader class of foreigners, those
able to demonstrate only that they have a reasonable, well-founded
fear of persecution should they be returned to their place of origin.
126. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 208(a), 243(h), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 (a),
1253(h) (1988); see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988).
128. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-430 (1984).
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(42) (1988).
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
131. See INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
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The federal courts have broadly interpreted the types of persecu-
tion covered by sections 208(a) and 243(h)(1) of the Act. For in-
stance, persecution on account of the victim's sex, though not
explicitly covered in the Act, has been found to invoke the Act's pro-
tection as persecution based on political opinion. 3 2 Similarly, perse-
cution based on social group has been defined to include persecution
on account of any immutable characteristic or shared experience.
133
Another court has described social group persecution as persecu-
tion on account of a characteristic that is either beyond the control of
the individual to change or so fundamental to the individual's identity
that he or she ought not be expected to change it.' 34 Furthermore,
persecution based on one's refusal to take sides in a conflict has been
deemed political persecution, neutrality being the political opinion
held by the persecuted applicant. 35 There are also cases in which vic-
tims have suffered persecution based on political opinion even though
they had no political opinion or did not have one contrary to their
persecutors. In Lazo-Mujano v. INS,"36 the Ninth Circuit held that an
applicant who suffered persecution due to a political opinion not actu-
ally held, but imputed by her persecutors qualified for the protection
of the statute.' 37 The liberal manner in which refugee status and asy-
lum have been afforded to applicants, combined with the recent inci-
dence of human rights abuses in Haiti, strongly suggests that a large
proportion of Haitian emigrants are refugees eligible for asylum
status.3
Under current law of due process, these refugees have a right not
to be repatriated without a fair hearing to determine if each emi-
grant's experiences meet the criteria for refugee status under the Im-
migration and Nationality Act.
132. See Lazo-Mujano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1987).
133. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (1985).
134. See Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985).
135. See Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding political
persecution where neutral was persecuted by guerrillas); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767
F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding political persecution where neutral was persecuted
by government).
136. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
137. See Id. at 1435.
138. In defending the current interdiction policy before the Supreme Court in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993), the government conceded that there was
widespread political persecution in Haiti and that a "significant minority" of those fleeing
Haiti had facially valid asylum claims. See Patrick, supra note 107, at 3.
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B. Procedural Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that
no one may be deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law."' 39 An interest which reaches the level of "property" or
"liberty" merits procedural protection under this clause.140 Through-
out the first part of the Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court de-
fined "liberty" and "property" interests very narrowly, relying on a
distinction between some interests deemed "rights" and others
deemed "privileges.'' While the government could not deny some-
one a right without providing due process, a privilege could be denied
an individual for any reason without constitutional implications. 42
Justice Holmes gave this rigid distinction between rights and privileges
its definitive statement while he still sat on the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts. Dismissing the claim of a person who had been
fired for violating a police department regulation that forbade off-the-
job political activity, Holmes wrote that "[tihe petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the
servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free
speech, as well as of idleness, by the implied terms of the contract.
The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the
terms which are offered him."'"
Under this rigidly categorical doctrine, the Due Process Clause
protected chattel, real property, and bodily integrity from interference
by the state. Due process did not, however, protect a person denied
government benefits such as employment, welfare, or other intangible
interests. 45 Thus, the right-privilege distinction held "relations with
the government [to be] mere 'privileges' or 'gratuities,' not legally
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
140. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1976); Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 577 (1974).
141. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.2, at 581 (2d ed. 1992); see also Bailey v. Richard-
son, 182 F.2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (holding public employment a "privilege" rather than
a "right" and so the procedural protection of Due Process Clause not available to claim-
ant), affd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (per curiam).
142. 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 141, § 17.2, at 581.
143. William Van Alstyne, Cracks in The 'New Property. Adjudicative Due Process in
the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L.REv. 445, 445-46 (1977); 2 Rotunda & Nowak,
supra note 141, § 17.2 at 581.
144. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).
145. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 985 (1991).
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protected rights."'46 This reflected the economically libertarian con-
cept of government associated with the Court's decisions in the early
part of the Twentieth Century. 147
The laissez-faire jurisprudential philosophy that gave rise to the
right-privilege distinction came under assault in the 1930s with the
New Deal's expansion of the regulatory state, and a corresponding
change in the role of the Supreme Court." The right-privilege dis-
tinction itself survived a few years longer in procedural due process
jurisprudence, not being fully eliminated until the 1960s. A major fac-
tor in the demise of the right-privilege distinction was the doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions."'1 49 This doctrine established generally
that the government may not do indirectly what the Constitution for-
bids it to do directly. 50 Thus, even "privileges" cannot be denied for
reasons which violate the Constitution, and the government cannot
make status or other benefits conditional upon forgoing constitutional
rights.'51 The right-privilege distinction was also undermined by sub-
stantive due process and equal protection cases which limited the gov-
ernment's power to arbitrarily restrict freedoms not explicitly listed in
the Bill of Rights.5 2
In the 1960s, the last nails were finally driven in the coffin of the
right-privilege distinction. An article by Professor William Van Al-
styne'53 pointed out that the distinction was circular because it al-
lowed the government to be constrained only by those rights it chose
to recognize and thus provided chimerical protection for individual
liberties. 54 Similarly, in a pair of articles published in the Yale Law
146. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 1669, 1718 (1975).
147. See STONE, supra note 145, at 985; see, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238
(1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
148. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see generally, Rich-
ard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987).
149. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 141, § 17.2, at 582; see also Robert M.
O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 443 (1966); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 327 (1935).
150. 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 141, § 17.2, at 582.
151. Id.
152. Id., § 17.2, at 583.
153. William Van Alstyne, The Demise Of The Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
154. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 141, § 17.2, at 583.
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Journal, Professor Charles Reich pointed out the illogical and outmo-
ded nature of the fight-privilege distinction."' 5
In addition to his criticism of the right-privilege distinction, Pro-
fessor Reich offered a proposal to fill the gap in due process jurispru-
dence left by its demise.'56 He noted that in an age of rapidly
expanding administrative power, various forms of status conferred by
the government had come to serve in our society as the "boundary
between individual man and the state," that had been provided by real
property and chattel in times gone by.'5 7 Professor Reich wrote, "it
must be recognized that we are becoming a society based upon rela-
tionship and status [rather than upon ownership of property]-status
deriving primarily from source of livelihood. Status is so closely
linked to personality that destruction of one may well destroy the
other. Status must therefore be surrounded with the kind of safe-
guards once reserved for personality."' 58 Thus, in order for the Due
Process Clause to protect individual interests as the Framers intended,
government-conferred status, such as welfare and employment, must
be considered the "new property" and must be afforded the protec-
tions of procedural due process.'
59
In 1970, Reich's proposal for treating status as a "new property"
became law when the Supreme Court adopted it in Goldberg v.
Kelly.' 60 In Goldberg, the Court held that a welfare recipient's inter-
est in the continued receipt of benefits was a "statutory entitlement"
that amounted to a property interest within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause.' 61 The Court held that the statute creating the wel-
fare scheme also created a vested constitutional property interest in
the continued receipt of benefits which could only be divested through
certain constitutionally mandated procedures. 62 Without such safe-
guards, the increasing number of people dependent on government
programs in areas such as welfare and employment would be subject
155. Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Is-
sues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255-57 (1965) [hereinafter Reich, Emerging Legal Issues];
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733,787 (1964) [hereinafter Reich, The
New Property].
156. Reich, The New Property, supra note 155, at 785.
157. Reich, The New Property, supra note 155, at 733.
158. Id. at 785.
159. See Reich, The New Property, supra note 155 at 785.
160. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
161. Id. at 264 n.8; see STONE, supra note 145, at 986.
162. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266.
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to the arbitrary will of public officials. 163 Changing times dictated a
new, more expansive interpretation of the Due Process Clause in or-
der for it to serve its traditional functions.' 4
Soon after Goldberg, the Court extended the requirements of
procedural due process to the government's activities in its relations
with prisoners,' 65 parolees,'166 students, 67 automobile drivers,'168 debt-
ors, 69 and employees,' 70 among others.' 7 ' For instance, the expansive
and flexible Goldberg procedural due process analysis was applied to
the termination of government employees in Perry v. Sindermann72
and its companion case, Board of Regents v. Roth.' 3 In these two
cases, the Court held that government employment can be a property
interest subject to due process protection and that in such cases termi-
nation can occur only through certain constitutionally mandated pro-
cedures.' 74 In Roth, the Court held that Roth possessed no property
interest because the terms of his employment with the state college
were defined by administrative rules in such a way that he had no
reasonable, non-unilateral expectation of continued employment once
his contract expired.' 75 Thus, although the respondent obviously had
an "abstract concern" in being rehired, there was no statutory entitle-
ment sufficient to trigger due process protection.
76
In Perry v. Sindermann, however, the Court found that the un-
written practices and customs of the state college gave rise to a rea-
sonable mutual expectation of continued employment, giving the
plaintiff a "legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure."'17 7 The col-
163. See Reich, The New Property, supra note 155, at 786-87; STONE, supra note 145, at
986.
164. See Reich, The New Property, supra note 155, at 733; see also Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
263 n.8 (quoting Reich, Emerging Legal Issues, supra note 155, at 1255).
165. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
166. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
167. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
168. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
169. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
170. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
171. See Van Alstyne, supra note 143, at 456-57; see generally Doug Rendelman, The
New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. LJ. 531 (1975).
172. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
173. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). But see Van Alstyne, supra note 143, at 457-58 (arguing that
Roth and subsequent cases are a retreat from the procedural due process doctrine an-
nounced in Goldberg).
174. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78; Perry, 408 U.S. at 599-600.
175. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
176. Id.
177. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602.
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lege could not terminate Sindermann, depriving him of this property
right, without due process. 78
Goldberg, Roth and Perry significantly altered the nature and
meaning of procedural due process. After Goldberg, constitutionally
protected interests could arise from agency rules, customs, or statutes
that conferred what had once been considered mere privileges rather
than rights. The Court picked up the gauntlet laid before it by critics
such as Professor Reich, and created a "new property." As the Court
stated in Roth, "[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are de-
fined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independ-
ent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.' 79
Once a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause
has been identified, the next step in procedural due process analysis is
to determine precisely how much procedural protection the Constitu-
tion requires the property interest be given or, in other words, what
process is due. 8 There are two basic schools of thought regarding
this phase of procedural due process analysis. These two approaches
are clearly exemplified in the majority and dissenting opinions of
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.'81 In finding that a gov-
ernment employee had a property interest in continued employment,
the majority in Loudermill held that the substantive entitlement cre-
ated by the relevant statute is separate from any procedures provided
in the statute. 82 Thus, once a statute establishes an entitlement, the
Constitution dictates the procedures by which the recipient can be de-
prived of it, and any procedures provided in the statute or administra-
tive rule must meet constitutional standards. 83
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Loudermill illustrates the opposing
view. According to Justice Rehnquist, the procedures provided in the
entitlement-creating statute are part and parcel of the property inter-
est created. 84 Therefore, courts cannot logically separate substantive
178. Id. at 603.
179. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
180. See Town Court Nursing Ctr., Inc., v. Beal, 586 F.2d 280,290 (3d Cir. 1978); Esco-
bar v. INS, 896 F.2d 564, 570-71 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
181. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
182. Id. at 548 (citations omitted).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 563 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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rights and procedure.'85 In Justice Rehnquist's words, the applicant
"must take the bitter with the sweet."' 86 While this view is undeniably
logical, its practical effect would be to nullify the doctrine of proce-
dural due process as it has developed since Goldberg. If the process
constitutionally due is merely whatever procedure the agency or legis-
lature already provides in the statute or regulation in question, then
the Due Process Clause would have little practical effect. Such a nar-
row view of procedural due process is antithetical to the expansive
and flexible understanding of procedural due process brought to life
by Goldberg, and would return procedural due process to the
"wooden distinction between rights and privileges that once seemed
to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.'
1 87
Rehnquist's "bitter with the sweet" approach has never com-
manded a majority. 88 Accordingly, once a court finds a constitutional
property interest, it must then determine whether the interest has
been afforded adequate procedural protection.'89 If the statute does
not provide adequate procedural protection, then the court must de-
termine what additional procedural safeguards the Constitution re-
quires. The framework for making such determinations was
definitively articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.'90 Under Mathews, a
court looks first at the private interest affected by the government ac-
tion; second, it examines the risk that an erroneous deprivation of the
interest will occur due to the procedures currently employed and the
utility, if any, of affording additional procedural safeguards; finally, it
considers the burden that would be imposed on the government by
requiring additional procedural protection.' 9 '
These principles of due process dictate that interdicted Haitian
refugees have a property interest in not being repatriated before they
receive a meaningful asylum hearing.
III. The Procedural Due Process Rights of Interdicted
Haitian Refugees
For over a hundred years, the Supreme Court has intimated that
Congress and the executive share plenary power to regulate immigra-
185. Id. at 562 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
186. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974).
187. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571 (citations omitted).
188. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 540-41.
189. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541.
190. 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976).
191. Id. at 334-35.
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tion.'1 Before the Act of March 3, 1875'1 barred the admission of
convicts and prostitutes, neither Congress nor the President had made
any consistent efforts to regulate immigration. 94 Seven years later,
Congress passed the first general immigration statute, the Act of Au-
gust 3, 1882.19 In 1889, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to an
immigration statute that forbade the entry of Chinese laborers in the
Chinese Exclusion Case.'96 Although Congress was engaging in invid-
ious racial discrimination, 197 the Court held that the decision of Con-
gress was outside the scope of judicial scrutiny, the political branches
of the federal government sharing plenary authority over the admis-
sion of foreigners to the United States. 98
This broad dicta giving the political branches "plenary power" to
control immigration subsequently became limited according to
whether the foreigner whose immigration was being controlled was
facing exclusion or deportation proceedings. 199
Several years after plenary power over immigration was .ascribed
to Congress in the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court substantially
limited that power in the deportation context in the Japanese Immi-
grant Case. 200 The Court has since held that "aliens [facing deporta-
tion] may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law." 0' 1
While remaining in the United States has been deemed a consti-
tutional property interest for foreigners facing deportation,202 the due
192. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 761 (1972).
193. 18 Stat. 477.
194. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 761.
195. 22 Stat. 214; see Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 761.
196. Chae Chang Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
197. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 770 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Chae Chang
Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
198. See Chae Chang Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
199. A foreigner will face deportation proceedings if he or she has made an "entry" into
the United States, either with a valid visa or illegally. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra
note 141, § 22.2, at 598 n.1. A foreigner will face exclusion proceedings only if he or she is
attempting to gain admission at the border or a port of entry. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 25 (1982). .This may include a foreigner who is detained at the border and granted
parole whereby he or she may remain in the United States pending a determination of his
or her admissibility. If found inadmissible, the paroled foreigner will be excluded rather
deported despite his or her physical presence in the United States. See 3 ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 141, § 22.2, at 599 n.1.
200. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
201. Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,212 (1953); see Rosenberg
v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 460 (1963); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-97
(1953).
202. See Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 597.
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process rights of foreigners facing exclusion is less clear. In contrast to
the deportation context, the Supreme Court has on several occasions
following the Chinese Exclusion Case reaffirmed in broad dicta Con-
gress' "plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to
exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has
forbidden."20 3 For example, in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy,20 4 the Court held that the Attorney General could legally ex-
clude a foreigner without a hearing, based on his individualized
finding that the foreigner's admission would be prejudicial to the in-
terests of the United States.2 °5 In refusing to review the Attorney
General's exclusion decision, the Court wrote that "[w]hatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
Alien denied entry is concerned."2 "6
Similarly, three years later in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei20 7 a foreigner was excluded from the United States on the
ground that he was a threat to national security. Because no other
nation would accept him, the would-be immigrant remained confined
on Ellis Island.208 The Court agreed with the Attorney General that
Mezei's continued detention did not violate the Constitution, quoting
with approval the Court's statement in Knauff that whatever proce-
dure Congress chooses to provide an excludable foreigner is due pro-
cess. 20 9 During the same period, in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,210
the Court heard a foreigner's claim that he had been improperly sub-
jected to exclusion, and instead should have been afforded a deporta-
tion proceeding. Finding that he was properly subject to deportation
rather than exclusion, the Court held that he was entitled to due pro-
cess. 211 The Court echoed the sentiments of Knauff and Mezei, how-
ever, writing that if Kwong Hai Chew had been properly subject to
exclusion instead of deportation, he could have found no refuge in the
Constitution.1 2
In the forty years following these cases, a split has developed
among lower courts as to the extent to which unadmitted foreigners
have due process rights. Some courts have interpreted the Knauff,
203. Boutlier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).
204. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
205. Id. at 542-43.
206. Id. at 544.
207. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
208. Id. at 207.
209. Id. at 212.
210. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
211. Id. at 597.
212. Id. at 596 n.5.
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Mezei and Kwong Hai Chew line of cases broadly, giving effect to
these cases' most extravagant dicta and thus placing unadmitted for-
eigners categorically outside the Bill of Rights' protections with re-
gard to the government's immigration decisions.213 Other courts have
interpreted Mezei, Knauff and Kwong Hai Chew much more narrowly
and held that unadmitted foreigners enjoy significant constitutional
protection even in matters related to immigration.214 The weight of
logic, Supreme Court precedent, and commentators' opinions support
the latter line of cases, and mandate that the broad dicta of Knauff,
Mezei, and Kwong Hai Chew cannot be properly considered to deny
excludable foreigners all due process rights in the immigration
context.215
The critical language in Mezei, Knauff and Kwong Hai Chew is
clearly dicta.216 The narrow question addressed in Mezei and Knauff
was whether, during wartime, the denial of a hearing to foreigners
whom the Attorney General had deemed threats to national security,
violated due process of law.217 The question decided in Kwong Hai
Chew was whether Kwong Hai Chew's expulsion should be properly
effected through deportation rather than exclusion proceedings and
whether a deportable foreigner had due process rights.218
Dicta generally is entitled to "no more deference than logic and
principle would accord it."'219 Under this standard, the broad dicta in
Mezei, Knauff and Kwong Hai Chew deserves no deference whatso-
ever.220 As a matter of logic, it is difficult to accept their suggestion
213. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396,1405 (D.D.C. 1985)
(holding that foreigners have no constitutional right to enter United States), affd on other
grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 967-75 (11th Cir.
1984) (holding that excludable foreigners have no due process right to notice of right to
seek asylum and no equal protection rights regarding the INS's decisions whether to grant
them parole); cf. Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1514 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that civil rights lawyers have no First Amendment right of access to Haitian
Refugees).
214. See, e.g., Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 876-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (excludable
foreigner seeking political asylum has due process right to fair hearing); Rogdriguez-Fer-
nandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1386-89 (10th Cir. 1981) (excludable foreigner's deten-
tion by INS violates due process).
215. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 141, § 22.2, at 599.
216. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 872-73 (1985) (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 207-210; Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539-543; see Jean, 472 U.S. at 872
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
218. Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 596-99; see Jean, 472 U.S. at 872-73 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
219. Jean, 472 U.S. at 873 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
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that excludable aliens are outside the Constitution's protection. This
would imply that the Attorney General could, for example, invoke
immigration goals to justify a decision to stop feeding all detained ex-
cludable foreigners, arguing that scarce immigration resources would
be better spent patrolling borders than providing food for detain-
ees.22' Such conduct by the Attorney General would surely violate
the Due Process Clause.222 Indeed, in his dissent in Meze' 2a Justice
Jackson asked, "[b]ecause the respondent has no right of entry, does it
follow that he has no rights at all? Does the power to exclude mean
that exclusion may be continued or effectuated by any means which
happen to seem appropriate to the authorities? It would effectuate
his exclusion to eject him bodily into the sea or set him adrift in a
rowboat. Would not such measures be condemned judicially as a dep-
rivation of life without due process of law?"'224 Commentators, as well
as Supreme Court justices, have long felt that the dicta of Mezei,
Knauff, and Kwong Hai Chew defy logic.
2 2
A fairly recent Supreme Court case supports the proposition that
excludable foreigners may make constitutional challenges to the oper-
ation of the immigration laws. In Landon v. Plasencia,226 the Court
began its constitutional analysis by citing Knauff and Kwong Hai
Chew with approval, stating that "an alien seeking initial admission to
the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights
regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a
sovereign prerogative. ' 227  The Court then implicitly rejected the
broad dicta in Mezei, Knauff, and Chew by granting due process rights
to an excludable foreigner who was challenging the INS' decision not
to admit her.2'
221. This question was asked and answered by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Jean,
472 U.S. at 874.
222. Id.
223. Also dissenting were Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas. See Mezei, 345 U.S.
at 216, 218.
224. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 226-27 (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
225. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. RExV. 1362, 1392-96 (1953) (describ-
ing Mezei's dicta as "patently preposterous"); David A. Martin, Due Process and the Treat-
ment of Aliens, 44 U. Pr=r. L. REv. 165, 176 (1983) (describing Mezei as a "scandalous
doctrine, deserving to be distinguished, limited, or ignored"); Peter H. Shuck, The Trans-
formation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20 (1984); Developments in the
Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. RExV. 1286, 1322-24 (1983);
Richard F. Hahn, Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM.
L. REv. 957, 976-83 (1982); see also Jean, 472 U.S. at 876 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
226. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
227. Id. at 32 (citing Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542).
228. Landon, 459 U.S. at 334.
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The most accurate statement of the law in this confused area is
probably that of the Second Circuit in Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava.'2 9 The
court stated there that while foreigners seeking admission for the first
time can assert only limited rights concerning their entry, ones who
claim rights to more than mere admission, such as a right to apply for
political asylum, can bring constitutional claims.3 0 The court specifi-
cally held that the excludable Chinese stowaways seeking relief had a
due process right to apply for political asylum "[b]ecause the severity
of harm to the erroneously excluded asylee outweighs the administra-
tive burden of providing an asylum hearing."' 31
The view of the Second Circuit in Chun-that excludable foreign-
ers can bring due process challenges to the Attorney General's en-
forcement of the immigration'laws-is supported by several Supreme
Court decisions besides Landon. For instance, in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States,2 2 the Supreme Court wrote that Congress' immigration
power must be exercised "consistent[ly] with the Constitution" and
must yield to the intervention of the judiciary where "required by the
paramount law of the Constitution.'' 233 Similarly, the Supreme Court
in Galvan v. Press"4 observed that "since he is a 'person,' an alien has
the same protection for his life, liberty and property under the Due
Process Clause as is afforded to a citizen." 5 Accordingly, as Justice
Marshall wrote in Jean, both pure logic and Supreme Court precedent
demonstrate the "acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under
the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to regu-
late the admission and exclusion of aliens. ' 2 6
Because they are protected by the Due Process Clause, inter-
dicted Haitian refugees, like the plaintiffs in Goldberg and Perry, can
make constitutional claims based on their reasonable reliance on the
Immigration and Nationality Act,2 7 on the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 8 on INS regulations governing
229. 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983).
230. Id. at 876-77.
231. Id.
232. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
233. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 712-13.
234. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
235. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530.
236. Jean, 472 U.S. at 875-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
237. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
238. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 33 (1967), 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 6577, discussed infra, notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
1096
Summer 1994] HAiTIAN REFUGEES"DUE PROCESS RIGHTS' 1097
political asylum and refugee status,2 9 and on the customs of the INS
and other government agencies. 24° Following the Goldberg analysis,
these laws and modes of government conduct create a reasonable ex-
pectation that refugees will not be repatriated if they have legitimate
asylum claims. The reasonable expectation arising out of statutes,
treaties, regulations, and practices creates a property interest of which
Haitian refugees cannot be deprived without due process. Because
Haitian refugees with valid asylum claims have a property interest in
not being repatriated, Supreme Court precedent requires that a mean-
ingful asylum hearing be given before this property interest is taken
away.
A. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and
Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
In 1968, the United States became a party to the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.2 41 With the other partici-
pants at the Convention, the United States agreed not to "return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion."'242 The term "refugee" is defined by the
Protocol as "[a]ny person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality.., and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion .. .. "243 When reforming the United
States' refugee and asylum law in 1980, Congress adopted the Proto-
col's definition of a "refugee" verbatim in section 101 of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act,244 demonstrating Congress' intent to honor
its commitments under the Protocol agreement.245 At the same time,
239. See infra notes 288-90 and accompanying text discussing 8 C.F.R. §§ 207.2(a) and
207.2(b).
240. See infra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
241. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 33 (1967), 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.IA.S. 6577; see Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1501
(1992).
242. Id.
243. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 33 (1967), 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 6577.
244. See Baker, 953 F.2d at 1501; Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
245. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984); see also Baker, 953 F.2d at 1500-01.
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Congress amended section 243(h) of the Act in three important re-
spects. These changes fundamentally altered American refugee and
asylum law, bringing it into compliance with the Protocol. 46 First,
Congress deleted the words "within the United States" from the
clause defining the class of aliens to which the statute applies.247 Sec-
ond, Congress added "return" to the statute, thus barring the govern-
ment not merely from deporting, but also from returning foreigners
who have valid asylum claims. 4 8 Third, Congress removed the Attor-
ney General's discretion in deciding whether or not a foreigner will
receive asylum.249 Since 1980, the prohibition against returning or de-
porting a foreigner with a valid asylum claim has been absolute 50
As amended in 1980, section 243(h) gives the Attorney General
discretion only in the sense that the provision of asylum status is con-
tingent on her good faith determination "that such alien's life or free-
dom would be threatened."'" The Attorney General is obligated to
determine in good faith whether there is a viable claim of persecution,
political or otherwise, in each case.1 2 Once this determination is
made, the Attorney General, or her agent, shall not deport or return
any foreigner with a valid claim.5 3
B. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith
In Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith,1 4 a class of Haitian refugees
present in the United States who had applied for asylum claimed that
the procedures employed to evaluate their asylum claims were unfair
246. See id.
247. Prior to 1980, section 243(h) provided: "The Attorney General is authorized to
withhold deportation of any alien... within the United States to any country in which in
his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or polit-
ical opinion and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason."
Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1965). After amendment in
1980, the statute provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or return any
alien.., to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom
would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988) ("The Attor-
ney General shall not ... return any alien... to a country if the Attorney General deter-
mines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened.").
251. Id.
252. Id.; see Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1039.
253. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
254. 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982), modifying Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F.
Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
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and violated their due process rights. 5 Specifically, they alleged that
the INS conducted their asylum applications in an arbitrary manner
by intimidating claimants, by refusing to process asylum claims and
maintain records of asylum interviews, and by failing to hold private
asylum interviews. 6 The Fifth Circuit held that the Haitians had a
statutorily-created right to make a meaningful application for political
asylum, a right triggering the protection of the Due Process Clause.
257
The court found that the Haitians had a constitutional property inter-
est derived from a combination of three sources." The court found
that the United States' commitment to resolution of the world refugee
problem as expressed in the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees,2 9 read in conjunction with section 243(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act,26° express intent on the part of Con-
gress to grant foreigners the right to make a meaningful application
for political asylum.261 In addition to section 243(h) and the Protocol,
the court found that the INS regulations setting forth the procedures
by which foreigners apply for refugee status and political asylum 62
create a reasonable expectation that deportable Haitians would re-
ceive a meaningful and fair hearing to determine their eligibility for
asylum.263 Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, there is a procedural
due process right to make a meaningful asylum application.2 ' Under
Smith, the INS cannot deport Haitians who may have bona fide claims
to political asylum status without first providing them with a meaning-
ful and fair chance to apply.
265
Smith involved the rights of Haitians present in the United States
and facing deportation, rather than those interdicted in international
waters. While the reasoning applied by the court in Smith applies with
equal force to interdicted refugees, the recent Supreme Court case,
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,266 profoundly affects the application
of Smith to refugees who are outside the borders of the United States.
255. Id. at 1026.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1046.
258. Id. at 1037-38; see generally Sybil C. Peyer, Deportation-Haitian Refugee Center v.
Smith, 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (1983).
259. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 6577.
260. 8 U.S.C. §1253(h); see supra notes 244-53 and accompanying text.
261. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1038-39.
262. See I. at 1037 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 108.1, 108.2 (1978)).
263. Id. at 1038.
264. Id. at 1038-39.
265. Id. at 1038.
266. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
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C. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council
In Sale, the Haitian Centers Council (hereinafter "HCC") chal-
lenged the current interdiction program as violating section 243(h) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Protocol.267 Although
no constitutional issues were before the Court, the decision makes it
impossible to use section 243(h) or the protocol as due process
triggers.
In March, 1992, the HCC filed a class action in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York challenging various aspects of the United States'
interdiction and detention policy toward Haitian Refugees that ex-
isted prior to the Kennebunkport Order.268 The district court issued
an injunction prohibiting the government from denying immigration
attorneys access to prospective clients at Guantanamo Bay or from
processing any refugee who had been denied representation.269
While the government's appeal was pending, it altered its policy
toward Haitian refugees with the Kennebunkport Order on May 23,
1992. The district court promptly heard the HCC's challenge to the
new interdiction policy and denied its request for a temporary re-
straining order.2 70 The HCC appealed to the Second Circuit which
reversed the district court's order, holding that the government's repa-
triation policy violated section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act.271 The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to issue an order enjoining the government
"from returning to Haiti any interdicted Haitian whose life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
272
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that
neither section 243(h) 273 nor Article 33 of the Protocol applies extra-
territorially, and thus neither governs the interdiction of Haitian refu-
gees hundreds of miles from United States territory.274 The Court
267. Id. at 2556.
268. Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 807 F. Supp. 928, 929-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
269. Id. at 933-34.
270. Id. at 933.
271. Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1367-68 (2d Cir. 1992).
272. Id.
273. Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2562. Before the case was heard, the Clinton Administration
replaced the Bush Administration, and Chris Sale became the acting director of the INS.
Accordingly, when oral argument was held in March 1993, the case had been renamed Sale
v. Haitian Centers Council.
274. Id. at 2567.
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held that section 243(h) does not apply extraterritorially because Con-
gress did not contemplate that asylum screenings would take place
beyond the borders of the United States, and thus did not intend sec-
tion 243(h) to have extraterritorial application.27 Moreover, the
Court held that Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees has a similarly limited geographical scope.
276
The Court's rationale for this conclusion was largely coextensive with
the reasoning underlying its conclusion regarding section 243(h); the
Court noted that section 243(h), as amended in 1980, was intended to
conform with the Protocol.27 7 The Court held that, despite the Proto-
col's plain language,27 8 the contracting nations did not intend the
agreement to restrain their treatment of refugees beyond their
borders.279
The Court based this conclusion largely upon on scattered re-
marks during the convention by two delegates,2 0 and a curious redefi-
nition of the word "return," which the Court divorced from its plain
meaning, thereby conveniently creating a new term of art.28' The nar-
rowed legal meaning given the word "return" in the Protocol and sec-
tion 243(h) is more akin to "expel" or "deport" than the ordinary
meaning of "return." 2  The divestment of the word "return" of its
common meaning is curiously based on the distinction in American
immigration law between exclusion and deportation.2 3
275. Id. at 2562-63.
276. Id. at 2567.
277. Id. at 2562 (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984)).
278. Article 33 of the Protocol provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or
return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion." There are no geographic limita-
tions express or implied in the Protocol. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2563.
279. Id. at 2567.
280. Id. at 2566.
281. See id. at 2563-64.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 2563. The Court did not contend that the drafters of the Protocol or the
nations agreeing to be bound by it made any reference to American immigration law. See
id. Instead, the Court's interpretation of the Protocol violates a fundamental principle of
statutory interpretation by making one of the Protocol's terms redundant. By redefining
the word "return" to have the same meaning as "expel," the Court interpreted the Proto-
col to say, in essence, "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion." See id. at 2563-64. The Protocol actually states "[n]o Con-
tracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee.. . ." United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 33 (1967), 19 U.S.T. 6276,
T.I.A.S. 6577.
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In his dissent, Justice Blackmun accurately criticized the majority
opinion in Sale. He described the decision as holding "that the forced
repatriation of the Haitian refugees is perfectly legal, because the
word 'return' does not mean return, because the opposite of 'within
the United States' is not outside the United States, and because the
official charged with controlling immigration has no role in enforcing
an order to control immigration." '284 Justice Blackmun further criti-
cized the majority's reliance on the presumption against the extraterri-
torial application of statutes on the basis of the clarity of the text of
section 243 and the protocol. "The presumption runs throughout the
majority's opinion," Justice Blackmun wrote, "and it stacks the deck
by requiring the Haitians to produce 'affirmative evidence' that when
Congress prohibited the return of 'any' alien, it indeed meant to pro-
hibit the interception and return of aliens at sea. '2 5 Justice Blackmun
urged that the presumption that statutes are not applicable outside the
United States' territory was irrelevant with regard to the statute the
Court was reviewing. Rather, he argued, "It applies only where con-
gressional intent is 'unexpressed.' Here there is no room for doubt: a
territorial restriction has been deliberately deleted from the
statute. 286
Although Sale does not address any constitutional issues, the
Court's unequivocal holding that the Protocol and section 243(h) do
not apply outside of United States territory renders it impossible to
use these two laws as property interests to trigger the procedural pro-
tection of the Due Process Clause. Under the Goldberg analysis,
these laws create a property interest if they give rise to a reasonable,
non-unilateral expectation that Haitian refugees will not be inter-
dicted and repatriated without a meaningful asylum hearing. The
Sale Court's decision that these laws do not apply outside United
States territory would logically defeat any such expectation arising
from the Protocol or section 243(h).
284. Id. at 2568. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
285. Id. at 2576.
286. Id. (referring to 1980 amendment of section 243). Furthermore, the Sale majority
violated the maxim "that statutes should be interpreted, if explicit language does not pre-
clude, so as to observe due process in its basic meaning." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 165 (1951); see Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337,
356 (1937); American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 107-08 (1946); Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950).
287. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78 (finding that respondent had no property interest in
continued employment because the rules and policies of the university created no legiti-
mate claim to entitlement to continued dmployment); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
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D. Other Property Interests: Agency Regulations and Customs
Aside from the Protocol and section 243(h), there are other
sources of property interests for interdicted Haitians. The regulations
applying to any foreigner who comes in contact with the INS still pro-
vide that every foreigner who requests it shall receive a fair asylum
hearing.' One such regulation provides that "[e]ach applicant who
seeks admission as a refugee shall submit an individual form 1-590
(Registration for Classification as Refugee). 2 8 9 Another regulation
provides as follows: "Hearing. Each applicant [for refugee status] 14
years old or older shall appear in person before an immigration officer
for inquiry under oath to determine his/her eligibility for admission as
a refugee."2 9 These regulations suggest clearly that applicants for ref-
ugee status will have the merits of their claim evaluated with some
measure of procedural regularity.
Although the Immigration and Nationality Act, as interpreted by
the Court in Sale, does not require the INS to provide a fair asylum
hearing to an interdicted refugee who requests one, the INS regula-
tions still bind the agency until it changes them.291 Furthermore, these
regulations reflect the INS practice of giving any foreigner, whether
encountered outside the territory of the United States or not, a fair
asylum hearing if one is requested. The only deviation by the INS
from this uniform policy was the Kennebunkport Order, which ap-
plied only to Haitian refugees.2 92
Agency regulations providing that foreigners shall receive a
meaningful opportunity to apply for political asylum create a constitu-
288. See 8 CFR §§ 207(a)-(b) (1993).
289. 8 CFR § 207(a) (1993).
290. 8 CFR § 207(b) (1993).
291. Although the Court in Sale held that the Immigration and Nationality Act did not
prohibit the repatriation of Haitian refugees without an asylum hearing, the INS is still
bound by its rules and regulations until they are changed. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.
199, 235 (1974); Michigan Dep't of Educ. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 875 F.2d 1196,
1202 (6th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, as long as such regulations are on the books, they can
provide a constitutional property interest. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 456 n.27 (1979)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Property interests... are created and their dimensions are de-
fined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source ... rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits") (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
292. See Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1353 (1992); see also Treat
Haitians Fairly, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1994, at A12; Harold Hongju Koh, Closed-Door
Policy for Refugees, N.J. LJ., Aug. 23, 1993, at 26; Michael D. Patrick, The Supreme
Court's Haitian Interdiction Decision, N.Y.LJ., July 30, 1993, at 3; John G. Healy, Behind
the 'Caribbean Curtain', WASH. PosT, Feb. 24, 1993, at A19; John Lancaster, Flow of Hai-
tian Refugees Slowing, Coast Guard Says; Drop Follows New Policy on Prompt Return,
WASH. POsT, May 26, 1992, at A3.
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tional property interest under the Goldberg analysis. They support a
reasonable expectation on the part of interdicted refugees that the At-
torney General will follow them and provide a fair hearing to deter-
mine if the refugee is fleeing from political persecution. Such
regulations create a property interest that is "defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from" a source independent of the
Constitution.293
Indeed, following this analysis, the Fifth Circuit in Smith held that
deportable Haitians had a property interest created by INS regula-
tions.294 The Second Circuit reached the same result in Augustin v.
Sava,29 there relying wholly on INS regulations to find that a deport-
able Haitian refugee had a property interest in a fair asylum
hearing.296
In Augustin, a Haitian refugee contested his deportation, alleging
that he had been denied due process during his prior application for
asylum because he had not been provided with an interpreter or a
translator for his asylum hearing.2 7 These services, which the INS
refused to provide, were mandated by INS regulations.298 Based on
these regulations, the refugee had a reasonable expectation that he
would receive a fair asylum hearing, complete with services that would
allow him to communicate with the agents evaluating his claim. This
reasonable expectation created a property interest in not being de-
ported before it was determined by fair procedures whether he was
eligible for political asylum. Thus, the INS' failure to comply with its
own regulations violated his right to procedural due process.299 Re-
garding the agency regulations requiring translation and interpreta-
tion services, the Second Circuit wrote that "constitutionally protected
liberty or property interests may have their source in positive rules of
law creating a substantive entitlement to a particular government ben-
efit. In such a case, limited due process rights attach.13 0 Having
293. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
294. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038-40 (Former 5th Cir.
1982).
295. 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984).
296. Id. at 37.
297. Augustin was denied an interpreter for his asylum hearing, a translator for docu-
ments he wished to present as evidence, and a translation of the asylum proceedings. Id. at
36-38.
298. Id. at 36-37 (citing 8 CFR § 242.12 (1983) (interpreter) and 8 CFR § 103.2 (1983)
(translator)).
299. Augustin, 735 F.2d at 37.
300. Id. (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,226 (1976) and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 577 (1974)).
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found a property interest, the court determined that the process due
was the class of procedures mandated by the regulations which the
INS had failed to follow.
301
While Augustin and Smith deal with foreigners who are facing
deportation rather than exclusion, the rationale of these cases applies
with equal force to interdicted Haitian refugees. As discussed above,
the distinction between deportable and excludable aliens is not an ad-
equate basis upon which to deny a class of people the protection of
the Constitution.0
Another source of constitutional property interests for Haitian
refugees is not any formal rule of law, but rather the customs and
practices of the INS and the Coast Guard. It is the custom of the
executive branch not to repatriate foreigners without first determining
if they have legitimate asylum claims, whether the foreigners are en-
countered within or without United States territory. This policy was
changed in May 1992 only as to Haitian refugees. 33 This government
custom creates a reasonable expectation on the part of Haitian refu-
gees that they, like other refugees whom the United States en-
counters, will not be repatriated without the opportunity to make a
meaningful application for asylum. Supreme Court precedent clearly
establishes the creation of a constitutional property interest through
such government customs. Most notably, in Perry v. Sindermann, °4
the Court held that a university professor had a property interest in
continued employment due to the unwritten customs and practices of
the institution that employed him.305 Although the written rules and
policies of the university could not be reasonably interpreted to pro-
vide any guarantee of continued employment, it was the custom of the
university to renew the contracts of its professors. 6 The Court held
that the university could not discriminate against Sindermann in this
regard. Sindermann accordingly had a property interest in being
treated in the manner in which the university customarily treated
other professors, and his employment could be terminated only
through constitutionally-mandated procedures. 7 The Court wrote
that the customs and practices of the university amounted to "an un-
301. Id. at 37-38.
302. See supra notes 192-236 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
304. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
305. Id. at 602-03.
306. Id. at 599-600.
307. Id. at 600-02.
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written 'common law' . . . that certain employees shall have the
equivalent of tenure.
'30 8
While the goverment's deviation from its customary practices in
Perry occurred as to an individual, the deviation in asylum screening
procedures for interdicted Haitains affects an entire class of people.
This distinction, however, should not diminish the applicablity of
Perry: interdicted Haitian refugees have a reasonable expectation that
they will not be discriminated against, but be treated in the same man-
ner as refugees from any other country in the world and not be repa-
triated without a meaningful determination as to whether they are
fleeing political persecution. Anything less would violate the proce-
dural due process antidiscrimination principle implicit in Perry. Ac-
cordingly, under Perry, interdicted Haitian refugees have a
constitutional property interest in receiving a meaningful asylum
hearing.
These rights that have been discussed thus far are all firmly
grounded in the Supreme Court's procedural due process decisions
such as Goldberg and Perry. Each is created by reasonable expecta-
tions arising from rules of positive law or other government conduct.
They "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from" a source independent of the Con-
stitution.3 0 9 As such, they cannot be taken away without due process.
There is, however, another type of property interest - one that is
created independently of any government conduct via legislation, reg-
ulation, or custom - upon which interdicted Haitian refugees can
base a due process claim.
E. New Liberty Interests and Procedural Due Process
Even if interdicted Haitian refugees could invoke no statute, reg-
ulation, or government custom as a basis for a property interest, there
are still powerful arguments for giving them recourse in the Due Pro-
cess Clause from forcible interdiction. In his article, Cracks in 'The
New Property. Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative
State,3 1° Professor William Van Alstyne writes that, when individuals
deal with administrative agencies having the power to determine their
future, "personal freedoms [should be] sheltered from the government
308. Id. at 602; see also Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 456 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(customs of the state of Ohio create an "implicit promise" sufficient to create a constitu-
tionally protected interest in pro ha vice admissions to practice in Ohio courts).
309. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
310. Van Alstyne, supra note 143.
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in all its protean exercises of power."31' Professor Van Alstyne posits
that property interests sufficient to trigger the procedural protections
of the Due Process Clause should not be identified only by reference
to positive law or government custom. 312 His thesis is that due pro-
cess jurisprudence should "treat freedom from arbitrary adjudicative
procedures as a substantive element of one's liberty. '313 This liberty
would require the government to adequately justify its interests when
it fails to provide fair and reliable procedures, just as it must do when
it deprives an individual of tangible property314 or a vested entitle-
ment,315 or curtails substantive liberties such as free speech or pri-
vacy.31 6 Professor Van Alstyne proposes that the ideas of liberty and
procedural due process "easily accommodate a view that government
may not adjudicate the claims of individuals by unreliable means.
'31 7
Central to Professor Van Alstyne's proposal is his argument that
current procedural due process doctrine is arbitrary and overly rigid.
He writes that the requirement that property interests be created by
positive law carries with it "notions of personal entitlement and sine-
curism that no constitutional court since Lochner should desire to en-
courage. '318 He forcefully argues that the current mode of procedural
due process analysis has no logically consistent way of distinguishing
between the substantive rights which the laws are said to create and
the procedures to protect those rights, which are alone the subject of
constitutional review.319 This is true because "the aggregate of proce-
dural protections may well describe the very substance of a given free-
dom or liberty. '320 The Court's method of reviewing the procedural,
but not the substantive, aspects of legislation upon which claimants
base their due process claims is based on an inherently arbitrary and
illogical distinction. 32' Accordingly, Professor Van Alstyne asserts
311. Id. at 487 (emphasis in original).
312. See id. at 487.
313. Id. (emphasis in original).
314. See id.
315. See id.; see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972).
316. Van Alstyne, supra note 143, at 487; see, e.g., Casey v. Planned Parenthood of
Pennsylvania, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818-19 (1992); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds).
317. Van Alstyne, supra note 143, at 487.
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that a constitutionally protected interest in being free from procedural
unfairness "does not lack text, logic, flexibility, or precedent."
322
Professor Van Alstyne's ideas build on those of Professor Reich
which spawned a procedural due process evolution when the Court
adopted them in Goldberg.' Professor Reich, like Professor Van Al-
styne after him, argued for the evolution of procedural due process.
He proposed that the protection provided by procedural due process
must be expanded if it is to satisfy its traditional role in our society as
a buffer between state power and individual autonomy.324 Perhaps
the Court will take a cue from Professor Van Alstyne as it did twenty-
four years ago from Professor Reich.3 25
s
Professor Van Alstyne's criticism of current procedural due pro-
cess jurisprudence has been echoed by Professor Laurence Tribe and
several other commentators. These scholars criticize the identification
of property interests only by reference to affirmative government con-
duct as internally inconsistent and too narrow and rigid a conception
of the rights guaranteed by the procedural component of the Due Pro-
cess Clause.326
Professor Tribe has noted, for instance, that the Court's current
procedural due process analysis relies on an insupportable distinction
between substance and procedure.32 7 The distinction between a stat-
ute's provision of a substantive right and its provision of procedures to
protect that right is illusory. Professor Tribe concludes that the Court
must therefore move toward less deference on matters of substance or
more deference on matters deemed procedural. 328 Because the latter
course would nullify the Due Process Clause in an era where the gov-
ernment's role in the lives of its citizens has expanded dramatically,
the former course is necessary if the Due Process Clause is to retain
any force as a guarantor of individual freedom.32 9 Accordingly, Pro-
322. Van Alstyne, supra note 143, at 488.
323. Id. at 446-48.
324. See id. at 453; see also id. at 455-60 (discussing Reich's import in the procedural
due process evolution surrounding Goldberg); Roth, 408 U.S. at 571.
325. See Van Alstyne, supra note 143, at 455-56; see also Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261-62
n.8 (quoting Emerging Legal Issues, supra note 155, at 1255).
326. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITMONAL LAW § 10-12 at 712-13 (2d
ed. 1988); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L.REv. 405,
443-44 (1977); Mark Thshnet, The Newer Property: Suggesting for the Revival of Substan-
tive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261, 262-63 (1975); Comment, Entitlement, Enjoy-
ment and Due Process of Law, 1974 Duicn L.J. 89, 118-22 (1974).
327. TRIBE, supra note 326, § 10-12, at 712.
328. Id., § 10-12, at 713.
329. See id.
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fessor Tribe advocates abolishing the requirement that protectable in-
terests be created by positive law.330 With two modifications,
Professor Tribe echoes Professor Van Alstyne's suggestion that the
Due Process Clause be interpreted to encompass a freedom from arbi-
trary adjudicative procedures. 3 ' The first modification, that proce-
dural due process be viewed as having a participational as well as an
instrumental goal, is discussed below. Professor Tribe's second modi-
fication is to include the rule-making, as well as adjudicative, functions
of administrative agencies.33 2 Thus, according to Professor Tribe there
would be a freedom from fundamentally unfair agency rule-making as
well as the "freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures" pro-
moted by Professor Van Alstyne.3 3 3
Professor Tribe's first modification, advancing the participatory
function of due process, has particular relevance to the predicament of
interdicted Haitian refugees. Procedural due process should be
viewed as having "participatory" as well as "instrumental" goals.334
Professor Tribe notes that once the doctrine of procedural due process
is unhinged from the notion of what "belongs" to the person, it be-
comes apparent that unfairness inheres in the very act of disposing of
an individual's situation without allowing him or her to participate in
some meaningful way.33 5 If procedures are inadequate, then there is
unfairness not merely because a mistake is more likely to occur, as the
instrumental view of procedural due process suggests, but also "be-
cause such treatment seems incompatible with the person's claim to
being treated as a human being. 313 6 A participational as well as an
instrumental purpose is served by affording procedural due process
protection; due process can regularize "the interaction between the
individual and the state through requiring an interchange of views
before the state does the individual grievous harm.
337
Professor Tribe's understanding of the participational goals of
procedural due process would afford far greater protection to Haitian
refugees than does current due process doctrine. The participational
function of due process takes the Haitians' claim to a meaningful
hearing to determine if they qualify as political refugees beyond the
330. Id.
331. Id. (citing Van Alstyne, supra note 143, at 483, 487).
332. TRIBE, supra note 326, § 10-12, at 714.
333. Van Alstyne, supra note 143 at 487; see TRIBE, supra note 326, § 10-12, at 714.
334. TRIBE, supra note 326, § 10-12, at 713.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 714.
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level of a merely results-oriented emphasis on fairness. 38 The par-
ticipational interest involved in Professor Tribe's concept of proce-
dural due process places constitutional value on the Haitian refugees
as human beings who deserve to participate in the process and under-
stand the basis for the agency's decision, whether they ultimately qual-
ify for political asylum or not. Professor Tribe's approach would
demand that if interdicted refugees do not qualify for refugee status,
and are therefore returned to Haiti, they should know why. An indi-
vidual's right to participate in and understand an agency determina-
tion having such a profoundly adverse affect on their life is a liberty
interest that requires procedural fairness and regularity.339
Like the ideas of Professor Van Alstyne, those of Professor Tribe
apply with great force to the situation of interdicted Haitian refugees.
They are presently subjected to "procedural grossness" that is "pro-
foundly unfair and objectionable."340 Haitian refugees have a liberty
interest in "freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures," which
affords them uniform procedural protection under the Due Process
Clause to apply for political asylum in a meaningful manner.
IV. Substantive Due Process Rights of Interdicted Haitian
Refugees
A. Introduction
The doctrine of procedural due process dictates that the govern-
ment can achieve certain objectives only by providing those whose
interests are affected with specified procedural protection,34' whereas
the doctrine of substantive due process holds certain government
objectives impermissible regardless of the procedures employed in
achieving them.3 42 Thus, the former mode of review examines the
procedural fairness of government action, while the latter focuses on
whether the government action is itself constitutional, regardless of
the fairness of procedures employed.343 In this manner, "the due pro-
338. For example, under a wholly instrumental view of procedural due process, one
might only be concerned with the percentage of Haitian refugees awarded political asylum
as a proxy for whether the procedures employed are fair. Whether a reasonable refugee
felt they had been given a fair chance to present their claim for asylum would be of no
consequence.
339. See Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1984).
340. Van Alstyne, supra note 143, at 484.
341. JOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §10.6 at 321-22 (3d ed. 1986).
342. Id., §10.6, at 322; See deLeiris v. Scott, 642 F. Supp. 1552, 1567 (D.R.I. 1986)
343. See NOWAK, Er AL., supra note 341, §10.6, at 324.
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cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of sub-
stantive law as well as to matters of procedure.""
The substantive protection provided by the Due Process Clause
includes those individual rights explicitly described by the Bill of
Rights,345 but is not limited to them. 46 Similarly, while the substan-
tive protection afforded by the Due Process Clause includes some in-
dividual liberties because they were outside the realm of permissible
governmental intrusion when the Fourteenth Amendment was rati-
fied,347 it is not limited to such rights.348 Rather, "the full scope of
liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause... is a rational contin-
uum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantive
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . and. which also
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that cer-
tain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs
asserted to justify their abridgment. 3 49 As such, substantive due pro-
cess represents "a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter.
'350
In contrast to procedural due process analysis, substantive due
process analysis requires identifying a "fundamental fight." If the
government is intruding on a fundamental right, then the govern-
ment's actions must survive strict scrutiny.35 ' Accordingly, if the in-
terdiction and forced repatriation of Haitian refugees threaten a
fundamental interest, then the interdiction policy must pass strict scru-
tiny review,35 2 under which the government bears the burden of show-
ing that it is employing necessary means in furtherance of a
compelling or overriding government interest.3 5 3 The implications of
344. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992).
345. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).
346. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804-05.
347. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989).
348. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805.
349. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
350. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805.
351. See Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1468 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Individ-
ual rights not explicitly listed in the first eight amendments to the Constitution which have
been deemed fundamental by the Supreme Court include the right to privacy, see Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977), the right to engage in interstate travel, see
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969), the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966), and the right to association found in the penumbra
of the First Amendment. NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61
(1958).
352. NOWAK, Er AL., supra note 341, §10.6, at 370.
353. See id. at 690.
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strict scrutiny review upon the current interdiction policy are dis-
cussed below.
B. Substantive Due Process in the Context of Haitian Refugees
One interest possessed by Haitian refugees that is clearly funda-
mental is life. The United States government, of course, does not kill
Haitian refugees as a matter of policy. Many repatriated Haitians are
returned, however, to waiting oppressors where politically-motivated
violence resulting in death or serious injury is very likely. The United
States does not merely fail to rescue Haitian refugees. Rather, they
are moving away from Haiti under their own power, sometimes
headed for America, sometimes elsewhere." 4 The United States in-
tercepts these refugees and forces them to return to Haiti, in a very
real sense depriving many of them of life.
The government can, of course, take human life in certain circum-
stances, such as capital punishment, without violating the Constitution
if certain procedures are followed.3 55 In instances where the govern-
ment has the power to deprive an individual of life when it employs
the proper procedures, the proper mode of analysis to evaluate the
individual's constitutional rights is procedural, rather than substantive,
due process.3 56
In other situations, however, the government may not have the
constitutional power to deprive an individual of life, regardless of the
procedures it employed in doing so. For instance, when an individual
has committed no crime that would justify capital punishment, the
provision of fair procedures would be irrelevant to the constitutional-
ity of the government's action.357 In such cases, therefore, substantive
due process is the proper mode of analysis to determine if the govern-
ment is violating the Constitution. 58 In this context, Haitian refugees
fleeing political persecution who are returned to their persecutors
354. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2572 (1993) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (pointing out that the executive "has gone forth to seize aliens who are not at
its borders and return them to persecution") (emphasis in original); see also William Booth,
400 Haitians Let Ashore in U.S., S.F. CHRON., April 23, 1994, at A14 (stating that 40,000
Haitians have migrated to the Bahamas).
355. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
356. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972);
NOWAK, ET AL., supra note 341, § 10.6.
357. Cf. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (life may not be
taken by state for rape conviction because penalty would be grossly disproportionate pun-
ishment for an offense not involving loss of life).
358. Cf. 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 141, § 17.3, at 588 n.9.
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clearly fall under a substantive due process analysis. Because the indi-
vidual refugee stands accused of no crime or other conduct that merits
death, no procedures could validate the government's action.35 9 By
interdicting and repatriating Haitian refugees without an asylum hear-
ing, the executive branch affirmatively deprives them of the funda-
mental interest to life; accordingly, Supreme Court precedent requires
the application of strict scrutiny to the interdiction program.360
Haitian refugees also possess a fundamental right to be free from
government conduct that "shocks the conscience."36' While this sub-
stantive due process standard usually applies in the criminal setting,362
it also applies to the conduct of the INS toward Haitian refugees.
In Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno,363 a district court held that the INS
violated the substantive due process rights of an excludable Chineseimmigrant by attempting to repatriate him without affording him a
fair asylum hearing.3 4 The court found that the government's con-
duct shocked the conscience because Xiao would be persecuted in
China due to testimony he had given in a trial in the United States,
and because the INS had attempted to manipulate the assignment of
immigration judges in the asylum adjudication procedures in order to
reduce Xiao's chances of successfully applying.36
5
The conduct of the executive branch in forcibly repatriating Hai-
tian refugees to violent political persecution similarly "shocks the con-
science" and "exceeds all constitutional norms. 366 This conduct
shocks the conscience in the same manner as the Allies' forcible re-
turn of Jewish refugees to Nazi concentration camps during World
War 11.367 The forced repatriaton of Jewish refugees with full knowl-
edge of the fate awaiting them so shocked the conscience of the
United States and other nations that, in the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and other conventions, they promised that
"[n]o contracting state shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in
359. Cf Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,797 (1982) (defendant's life may not be taken
by state if the defendant did not actually kill the victim or intend lethal force to be used by
his cohorts); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 390-91 (1986) (following Enmund).
360. See Flores, 113 S. Ct at 1468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
361. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (conviction based on evidence
obtained by forcible stomach pumping overturned as violative of substantive due process).
362. See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1989).
363. 837 F. Supp. 1506 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
364. See id. at 1559.
365. Id. at 1558-59.
366. See id. at 1551.
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any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.
'368
Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 states that people of
all nations have the right to be free from political repression and to
leave their country. 69 Several other international instruments also
unequivocally impose a strict obligation of non-refoulement upon
contracting states.3 70 For instance, the 1967 Declaration on Territorial
Asylum of the United Nations General Assembly forbids subjecting
any person seeking sanctuary to rejection at the frontier or forcible
repatriation to any state where he or she might be persecuted.37 ' Sim-
ilarly, the Convention of the Organization of African Unity prohibits
rejection at the frontier or return of a refugee to a country "where his
life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened." 37z Finally, the
Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons noted that the principle
of non-refoulement of those who would face political persecution
upon return is a "generally accepted principle" of international law.373
Such international agreements and statements of principle pro-
vide evidence that the forced repatriation of political refugees shocks
the conscience of civilized nations. They also can serve, in substantive
due process analysis, as a basis for determining whether a right is fun-
damental. The appropriate parameters of substantive due process are
properly drawn not by arbitrary lines, "but rather from careful 're-
spect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie our society."' 374  International agreements to
which the United States was a party, such as those mentioned above,
368. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223; T.I.A.S. 6577.
The 1967 Protocol incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees. Id.; see Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396,
1400-01 (D.D.C. 1985).
369. G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. 1/777 (1948); see Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
370. See King, supra note 117, at 790.
371. Declaration on Territorial Asylum of December 14, 1967, G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N.
GAOR Supp., No. 16, art. 3(1), U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968); see King, supra note 117, at 790.
372. Convention of the Organization of African Unity, 8 Int'l Legal Mat. 1288, 1292
(1969), adopted by the assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixth Ordinary
Session (Addis Ababa, 10 September 1969). Entry into force, 20 June 1974. See King,
supra note 117, at 790.
373. Convention of the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, No. 5158, 118, 360
U.N.T.S. 122. See King, supra note 117, at 790.
374. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977) (quoting Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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have been employed by federal courts to discover the values that un-
derlie our society, and thus determine whether a right is fundamental.
For instance, in Lipscomb v. Simmons 75 the Ninth Circuit found that
foster children have a fundamental right to be placed with fit relatives,
in part by referring to international treaties and declarations which
supported the importance of this right.
376
In the case of interdicted Haitian refugees, the Lipscomb decision
supports finding a fundamental right not to be returned to political
oppression with reference to the principles articulated in international
treaties and declarations. At the very least Lipscomb provides a legit-
imate basis for referring to principles expressed in international trea-
ties and declarations in order to determine whether interdicted
Haitian refugees have fundamental rights that have been violated by
the government's conduct.
Under the "shock the conscience" standard recently applied in
Wang Zong Xiao, informed by the principles articulated in interna-
tional declarations and treaties in which the United States has partici-
pated, interdicted Haitian refugees have clearly been deprived of a
fundamental interest. With regard to the repatriation of Haitians fac-
ing political persecution, "under any formulation of the judicial con-
science, the governmental conduct . . . shocks it, and does so
flagrantly. ''3
77
A reasonable court could find that interdicted Haitian refugees
possess any of the aforementioned fundamental interests. Govern-
ment interference with such interests merits strict scrutiny analysis,
which requires that the government demonstrate that it is using "nar-
rowly focussed" means to achieve a "compelling and legitimate" state
interest.3
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In a situation such as the interdiction of Haitian refugees, strict
scrutiny analysis under Supreme Court precedent would require an
individualized determination that each refugee would not face polit-
ical persecution upon his or her return.379 Fair asylum proceedings
375. 884 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1988).
376. See Lipscomb, 884 F.2d at 1244 n.1. (stating that "[tihe constitutional right to asso-
ciate with family members is protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. No right is more sacred. This right is so fundamental that it has been recognized in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... among other international human rights
agreements.").
377. Wang Zong Xiao, 837 F. Supp. at 1511 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
378. See Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1468 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
379. Id. at 1468-71.
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would be the only appropriate way to accomplish this, making it un-
likely that a refugees with a legitimate claim to political persecution
would be repatriated. Indeed, the only time the Court has upheld a
serious infringement of liberty without requiring a case-by-case, indi-
vidualized determination regarding whether the infringement was nec-
essary to effect the government's compelling interest was in
Korematsu v. United States,38 ° where the Court upheld the internment
of Americans of Japanese decent during World War II.3s1
Conclusion
Interdicted Haitian refugees have a right to a meaningful hearing
to determine whether they would face political persecution if repatri-
ated. Tiis right can be found in both the procedural and substantive
components of the Due Process Clause if federal courts will apply
Supreme Court precedent without bias. The need for judicial inter-
vention may be obviated, however, by President Clinton's promise to
change the no hearing policy begun by President Bush with the Ken-
nebunkport Order in May, 1992. If Clinton gives each interdicted ref-
ugee a meaningful opportunity to show that they qualify for political
asylum, then the executive's violation of the Constitution will have
ended. However, such a course is unlikely because while providing
meaningful procedures is the morally and constitutionally correct
path, it is politically dangerous as long as the military government
headed by Raoul Cedras remains in power. The incidence of persecu-
tion by Cedras' government and factions allied with it is so great that
the provision of a meaningful asylum hearing would spawn an exodus
from Haiti, just as Clinton's campaign promises did in the Fall of 1992.
Such an exodus could have disastrous political consequences for Clin-
ton, and so providing meaningful asylum determinations without tak-
ing serious steps to reduce persecution in Haiti is an unlikely course.
Meaningful asylum hearings should be given to any interdicted refu-
gee before he or she is repatriated, but for this to be politically feasi-
ble Cedras' government must be ousted. Then it will be politically
feasible to provide any interdicted Haitian refugee with a meaningful
asylum hearing, or to suspend interdiction altogether, because many
fewer will be motivated to flee Haiti and few of those who do flee will
be doing so to escape persecution.
380. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
381. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1469 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
